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International Union, UA W v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc.: EMPLOYER MAY 
NOT BAR WOMEN FROM EM-
PLOYMENT WHICH MIGHT EX-
POSE UNBORN CHILD TO 
HARM. 
Rejecting a manufacturer's concerns 
over ''the welfare of the next genera-
tion," the Supreme Court has held that 
employers may not exclude women 
from positions which could pose hann 
to their unborn children. International 
Union, UnitedAuto., United Aero. and 
Agric. Implement Workers of America 
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 
1196,1207 (1991). Upon determining 
that exclusion of women was a facially 
discriminatory practice to which there 
was no lawful exception, the CQurt 
held that such discrimination consti-
tuted a violation of the Civil Rights 
Act § 703(a) (1964), as amended by 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988) (''Title 
VII"). 
Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") 
manufactures batteries, a commodity 
in which lead is a primary ingredient. 
Lead exposure can cause health prob-
lems, including harm to unborn chil-
dren. Johnson initially instituted a 
policy of warning female employees 
and potential female employees of the 
risks of lead, and had them sign a 
statement indicating they were so 
warned. Johnson altered its policy in 
1982, however, excluding all women 
capable of bearing children from jobs 
exposing them to lead. A class action 
challenging the policy was filed in 
1984 by a number of unions and indi-
viduals, including one woman who 
chose to undergo sterilization to avoid 
losing her job. 
The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
analyzed Johnson's policy using the 
three prong "business necessity de-
fense" originally used in the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal. Johnson, III S. Ct. at 1200. The 
elements of the test were as follows: 
(1) the activity's health risk to the 
fetus; (2) whether the hazard was trans-
mitted only through women; (3) 
whether a less discriminatory alterna-
tive to prevent the health risk exists. 
Id. at 1201. The court found that the 
activity ofbatterymaking did involve a 
substantial fetal health risk and that 
fetuses were vulnerable to lead levels 
which would not affect adults. The 
Petitioners presented no alternative 
policy to protect fetuses, and the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of 
Johnson. 
The district court further opined 
that because Johnson had met the busi-
ness necessity defense test, it would 
not have to utilize a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" ("BFOQ") analy-
sis. Id. A BFOQ exception would 
allow an employer to "discriminate on 
the basis of ' religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation ofthat particular business or 
enterprise.'" [d. at 1204 (citing Title 
VII § 703(e)(1». 
The district court grant of summary 
judgment was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sit-
ting en banco The court of appeals 
concluded that the district court cor-
rectly applied the business necessity 
defense, which ''balancers] the inter-
ests ofthe employer, the employee and 
the unborn child in a manner consistent 
with Title VII." Id. at 1201 (quoting 
International Union, UnitedAuto., etc. 
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 
871,886(1989»). Thecourtofappeals 
further concluded that had the BFOQ 
been the proper standard, it too would 
have been satisfied. The court ex-
plained that "industrial safety is part of 
the essence of respondent's business, 
and ... the fetal-protection policy is 
reasonably necessary to further that 
concern." Id. at 1201. 
Because the seventh circuit's hold-
ingthat fetal protection policies qualify 
as a BFOQ conflicted with Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuit decisions, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the issue. Justice Blackmun, 
speaking for the majority, initially de-
termined that the seventh circuit was 
wrong in "assum[ing] that because the 
asserted reason for the sex-based ex-
clusion (protecting women's 
unconceived offspring) was ostensibly 
benign, the policy was not sex-based 
discrimination." Id. at 1203. 
The Court first assessed evidence 
indicating that lead exposure has de-
bilitating effects upon both male and 
female reproductive systems. From 
this evidence, the Court determined 
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that regardless of benign intent, 
Johnson's policy of treating male and 
female employees differently was fa-
cially discriminatory. To bolster its 
conclusion, the Court cited the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
which provides that sex-based discrimi-
nation "includes discrimination 'be-
cause of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions.'" Id. at 1203 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k». 
Finding Johnson's policy discrimi-
natory, the Court proceeded to deter-
mine whether the policy could be ex-
cused as a BFOQ. After examining the 
statutory basis ofthe BFOQ standard, 
the Court emphasized that the defense, 
particularly for safety exceptions, 
"reaches only special situations." Id. at 
1204-05. Such special situations rec-
ognized by the Court included permit-
ting a prison to hire only male guards in 
areas of maximum security prisons 
housing males, and attempting to en-
sure airline safety by approving age 
restrictions for airline flight engineers. 
To qualify as a BFOQ, however, 
the ''job qualification must relate to the 
'essence,' orto the 'central mission of 
the employer's business.'" Id. at 1205 
(citations omitted). Relating the J ohn-
son facts to the BFOQ standards, the 
Court concluded that the standard was 
not met because a genuine concern for 
future generations cannot be recast as 
an "essential aspect ofbatterymaking." 
Id. at 1206. 
The Court also engaged in legisla-
tive history analysis of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, which has its own 
BFOQ criterion. The Act provides 
that, unless pregnant employees differ 
in their ability to perform, they must be 
treated the same as any other employee. 
Further, the Act's legislative history 
revealed Congress's decision to re-
serve to women the right to work while 
pregnant, or while capable of so be-
coming. Because the record indicated 
that pregnant women are as efficient as 
other employees in the manufacture of 
batteries, the Court concluded that the 
standard for upholding a BFOQ had 
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not been met. Having failed to estab-
lish either a business necessity defense 
or a BFOQ, the Court held that 
Johnson's policy constituted forbid-
den sex discrimination. Id. at 1207. 
The Court briefly addressed the is-
sue oftort liability. Because ''Title VII 
bans sex-specific fetal- protection poli-
cies," the Court felt the risk of liability 
of an employer who follows OSHA 
guidelines, informs women as to the 
risk, and is not otherwise negligent to 
be "remote at best." Id. at 1208. 
Justice White, joined by Justice 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
concurred with a portion of the 
majority's rationale, as well as with the 
judgment. The concurrence disagreed, 
however, ''that the BFOQ defense is so 
narrow that it could never justify a sex-
specific fetal protection policy." Id. at 
1210. White indicated that onejustifi-
cation for a BFOQ would be the avoid-
ance of substantial tort liability. As 
pertaining to the facts, White felt that it 
was not clear that Title VII would 
preempt state tort liability. He further 
stated that even if employees were 
precluded from making claims for in-
jury, their children still might be able 
to do so because ''the general rule is 
that parents cannot waive causes of 
action on behalf of their children." Id. 
at 1211. 
In holding that an employer may 
not discriminate against a woman on 
the basis ofher pregnancy or capability 
to become pregnant, the Supreme Court 
has furthered the beneficient goal of 
eradicating sex-based discrimnation 
Bound only by moral and ethical regu-
lation, however, expectant parents will 
be forced to engage in a most difficult 
balancing test, positing pecuniary in-
terests against the interest in insuring a 
healthy child. 
- Howard Cohen 
Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia: MARY-
LAND RESTRUCTURES THE 
LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
IN NON-INTENTIONAL TORT 
CASES. 
In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 
A.2d 633 (Md. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland pronounced 
sweeping changes respecting awards 
of punitive damages in non-intentional 
tort actions. In the first of three revo-
lutionary changes to Maryland law, the 
court abolished the longstanding "aris-
ing out of contract" test for punitive 
damages in tort actions where the par-
ties enjoy a contractual relationship. 
Second, the court reformulated the stan-
dard for determining whether punitive 
damages may be awarded by rejecting 
the established "implied malice" stan-
dard and adopting the exacting "actual 
malice" standard of conduct in its place. 
Third, the court announced that in all 
tort cases, plaintiffs must meet the 
heightened burden of proof of "clear 
and convincing" evidence when seek-
ing punitive damages. 
As a result of exposure to asbestos, 
plaintiffs William L. Zenobia 
("Zenobia") and Louis L. Dickerson 
("Dickerson") developed pleural and 
parenchymal asbestosis. Zenobia al-
leged that he had been exposed to 
asbestos while employed at various 
locations over a twenty-five month 
period from 1948 to 1968. Dickerson 
claimed exposure to asbestos during 
his employment with the Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation at Sparrows Point 
from 1953 until 1963. 
Both plaintiffs filed claims in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City seek-
ing damages for their asbestos related 
injuries and the complaints were con-
solidated for purposes of trial and ap-
peal. At trial, the plaintiffs abandoned 
all theories of liability except for strict 
liability under Section 402 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. The de-
fendants included six companies that 
had either manufactured or supplied 
and installed products containing as-
bestos. 
The jury awarded Zenobia com-
